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Abstract
We define solution concepts appropriate for computationally bounded players playing a fixed
finite game. To do so, we need to define what it means for a computational game, which is a
sequence of games that get larger in some appropriate sense, to represent a single finite un-
derlying extensive-form game. Roughly speaking, we require all the games in the sequence to
have essentially the same structure as the underlying game, except that two histories that are
indistinguishable (i.e., in the same information set) in the underlying game may correspond to
histories that are only computationally indistinguishable in the computational game. We define
a computational version of both Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium for computational
games, and show that every Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the underlying game corre-
sponds to a computational Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the computational game. One
advantage of our approach is that if a cryptographic protocol represents an abstract game, then
we can analyze its strategic behavior in the abstract game, and thus separate the cryptographic
analysis of the protocol from the strategic analysis.
1 Introduction
Game-theoretic models assume that the players are completely rational. This is typically interpreted
as saying that payers act optimally given (their beliefs about) other players’ behavior. However,
as was first pointed out by Simon [14], acting optimally may be hard. Thus, there has been a
great deal of interest in capturing bounded rationality, and finding solution concepts appropriate
for resource-bounded players.
One explanation of bounded rationality is that players have limits on their computational
power. For example, the players might be able to use only strategies that can be implemented
by a polynomial-time TM. While there has been a great deal of work [1; 4; 7; 6; 8; 9; 15] on solving
game-theoretic problems using computationally bounded players, there has not really been a careful
study of the solution concepts appropriate for such players. What does it mean, for example, to
say that a fixed finite game played by polynomial-time players has a Nash equilibrium?
Consider for example the following two-player extensive-form game G: At the the empty history,
player 1 secretly chooses one of two alternatives and puts her choice inside a sealed envelope. Player
2 then also chooses one of these two alternatives. Finally, player 1 can either open the envelope
and reveal her choice or destroy the envelope. If she opens the envelope and she chose a different
alternative than player 2, player 1 wins and gets a utility of 1; otherwise (i.e., if player 1 either
chose the same alternative as player 2 or she destroyed the envelope) player 1 loses and gets a
utility of −1. Player’s 2’s utility is the opposite of player 1’s. The game tree for this game is given
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Figure 1: A game that can be represented by a computational game.
in Figure 1. Since player 2 acts without knowing 1’s choice, the two histories where 1 made different
choices are in the same information set of player 2.
Resource-bounded players can implement this game even without access to envelopes, using
what is called a commitment scheme. A commitment scheme is a two-phase two-party protocol
involving a sender (player 1 above) and a receiver (player 2). The sender sends the receiver a
message in the first phase that commits him to a bit without giving the receiver information about
the bit (at least no information that he can efficiently compute from the message); this is the
computational analogue of putting the bit in an envelope. In the second phase, the sender “opens
the envelope” by sending the receiver some information that allows the receiver to confirm what bit
the sender committed to in the first phase. Thus, we can talk about a game G (actually a sequence
of games as discussed later) where instead of player 1 using an abstract envelope to send her choice
to player 2, she uses a commitment scheme to do so.
Intuitively, we would like to say that the two games represent the same underlying game.
However, there are many subtleties in doing so. To get a sense of the problems, note that to
use commitment schemes we need the players to be computationally bounded. But to talk about
computation bounds (for instance, polynomial-time TMs), we need to have a sequence of inputs
that can grow as a function of n. So how do we proceed if we want to talk about computationally
bounded players in a fixed finite game? The idea is that we will have a sequence of games, potentially
increasing in size, that represents the single game. As we shall see, the information structure of
the games in the infinite sequence might differ from that of the underlying game. For example, in
the games described before, while a commitment scheme gives no information to a computationally
bounded player, an unbounded player has complete information; the encrypted string uniquely
identifies the bit that was committed. Thus, unlike in G, commitments to different bits in G are in
different information sets for player 2.
Additional complications arise when we consider solution concepts for such games. Traditional
notions of equilibrium involve all players making a best response. But if we restrict to computation-
ally bounded players, there may not be a best response, especially for the kinds of cryptographic
problems that we would like to consider. For example, for every polynomial-time TM, there may
be another TM that does a little better by spending a little longer trying to do decryption. (See
[5] for an example of this phenomenon.) Moreover, when considering sequentially rational solution
concepts it is unclear what information structure should be considered since, as we discussed, the in-
formation structure of the computational games does not capture the knowledge of computationally
bounded players.
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Our contributions. As a first step to capturing these notions, in Section 3.1, we define what
it means for a sequence G = (G1, G2, . . .) of games to represent a single game G. Intuitively, all
the games in the sequence G have the same basic structure as G, but might use increasingly longer
strings to represent actions in G (e.g., an action a in G might be represented in Gn by an encryption
of a that uses a security parameter of length n). More precisely, we require a mapping from histories
in the games Gn to histories in G, as well as a mapping from strategies in G to strategies in G, and
impose what we argue are reasonable conditions on these mappings.1 In Section 3.2, we show how
this definition play out in the example discussed above.
As hinted before, our conditions do not force the games in G to have the same information
structure as G. While two histories in the same information set in Gn must map to two histories in
the same information set in G, it may also be the case that two histories in different information
sets in Gn are mapped to the same information set in G. Although a player can distinguish two
histories in different information sets (for example a commitment to 0 and a commitment to 1 in
the example are two different strings), at a computational level, she cannot tell them apart. The
encodings just look like random strings to her. There is a sense in which she, as a computationally
bounded player, does not understand the “meaning” of these histories (although a computationally
unbounded player could break the commitment and tell them apart). In Section 3.3, we make this
intuition precise, showing that our requirements force all histories that map to the same information
set in G to be computationally indistinguishable, even if they are in different information sets in G.
Once we have defined our model of computational games, we focus on defining analogues of
two solution concepts, Nash equilibrium (NE) and sequential equilibrium. In Section 4.1, we define
a computational analogues of NE, which considers only deviations that can be implemented by
polynomial-time TMs. It handles previously mentioned complications by allowing for the strategy
to be an  best response for some negligible function . (Our definition of NE is similar in spirit
to the definition in Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [1].) We show that if a strategy profile is a NE in
the underlying game G, then there is a corresponding strategy profile of polynomial time TMs
that is a computational NE in G. Thus, we provide conditions that guarantee the existence of a
computational NE, addressing an open question of Katz [10].
In Section 4.2, we define a computational analogue of sequential equilibrium. It is notoriously
problematic to define sequentially rational solution concepts in cryptographic protocols. For exam-
ple, Gradwohl, Livne, and Rosen [4] provide a general discussion of the issue, and give a partial
solution in terms of avoiding what they call “empty threats”, which applies only to two-player
games of perfect information, and discuss possible extensions. Our notion of computational sequen-
tial equilibrium, which is quite different in spirit from the solution concept of Gradwohl, Livne, and
Rosen (and arguably conceptually much simpler and much closer in spirit to the standard game-
theoretic definition), applies to arbitrary sequence of games that represent a finite game, and uses
the intuitions we develop on the connection between information sets in the underlying finite game
and computational indistinguishability in the sequence. We again show that if a strategy profile is
a sequential equilibrium in the underlying game G, then there is a corresponding strategy profile
of polynomial time TMs that is a computational sequential equilibrium in G.
An important benefit of our approach is that it separates the game-theoretic analysis from the
cryptographic analysis. We can view the sequence G as an implementation of an abstract game
G. Given this view, we can first prove that a protocol is a good implementation of an abstract
game, and then analyze the strategic aspects in that simple abstract game. For example, to show
a prescribed cryptographic protocol is a Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium, we can first show
it represents an abstract ideal game; it then suffices to show that the protocol corresponds to
1The idea of games that depends on a security parameter goes back to Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [1]. Huba´cˇek
and Park [9] also consider a mapping between histories in a computational game and histories in an abstract game,
although they do not consider the questions in the same generality that we do here.
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a strategy profile that is a Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the much simpler underlying
game. We give an exmaple of this idea in Section 5, where we show how our approach can be used
to analyze a protocol for implementing a correlated equilibrium (CE) without a mediator using
cryptography, in the spirit of the work of Dodis, Halevy, and Rabin [1].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Extensive-form games
We begin by reviewing the formal definition of an extensive-form game [12]. A finite extensive-form
game G is a tuple ([c], H, P, ~u, ~I) satisfying the following conditions:
• [c] = {1, . . . , c} is the set of players in the game.
• H is a set of history sequences that satisfies the following two properties:
– the empty sequence 〈 〉 is a member of H;
– if 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 ∈ H and L < K then 〈a1, . . . , aL〉 ∈ H. The elements of a history h are
called actions.
A history 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 ∈ H is terminal if there is no a such that 〈a1, . . . , aK , a〉 ∈ H. The set
of actions available after a nonterminal history h is denoted A(h) = {a : h · a) ∈ H} (where
h · · · a is the result of concatenating a to the end of h.2 Let HT denote the set of terminal
histories, let HNT denote H \HT , and let H i denote the histories after which player i plays.
• P : H \HT → [c]. P (h) specifies the player that moves at history h.
• ~u : HT → Rc specifies for each terminal history the utility of the players at that history (ui(h)
is the utility of player i at terminal history h).
• for each player i ∈ [c], Ii is a partition of H i with the property that A(h) = A(h′) whenever
h and h′ are in the same member of the partition. For I ∈ Ii, we denote by A(I) the set A(h)
for h ∈ I (recall that A(h) = A(h′) if h and h′ are two histories in I). We assume without loss
of generality that if I 6= I ′, then A(I) and A(I ′) are disjoint (we can always rename actions
to ensure that this is the case). We call Ii the information partition of player i; a set I ∈ Ii
is an information set of player i; ~I = (I1, . . . , Ic) is the information partition structure of the
game. A game of perfect information is one where all the information sets are singletons.
This model can capture situations in which players forget what they knew earlier. Roughly
speaking, a game has perfect recall if the information structure is such that the players remember
everything they knew in the past.
Definition 2.1. Let EXP i(h) be the record of player i’s experience in history h, that is, all the
actions he plays and all the information sets he encounters in the history. A game has perfect recall
if, for each player i, we have EXP i(h) = EXP i(h
′) whenever the histories h and h′ are in the same
information set for player i.
A deterministic strategy s for player i is a function from Ii to actions, where for I ∈ Ii, we
require that s(I) ∈ A(I). We also consider mixed strategies which are probability distribution over
deterministic strategies. A profile of strategies ~σ = {σ1, . . . , σc} induces a distribution denoted ρ~σ
2For technical convenience, we assume that |A(h)| ≥ 2 for all histories h. If this is not the case, then that step of
the game is not interesting, and can essentially be removed.
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on terminal histories. We say that a strategy profile is completely mixed if ρ~σ assigns positive prob-
ability to every history h ∈ HT . The expected value of player i given ~σ is then ∑h∈HT ρ~σ(h)ui(h).
We use the standard notation ~x−i to denote the vector ~x with its ith element removed and
(x′, ~x−i) to denote ~x with its ith element replaced by x′.
Definition 2.2 (Nash Equilibrium). ~σ = {σ1, . . . , σc} is an -Nash equilibrium (NE) of G if, for
all players i ∈ [c] and for all strategies σ′ for player i,∑
h∈HT
ρ~σ(h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HT
ρσ′,~σ−i(h)ui(h)− .
We now recall the notion of sequential equilibrium [11]. A sequential equilibrium is a pair (~σ, µ)
consisting of a strategy profile ~σ and a belief system µ, where µ associates with each information
set I a probability µ(I) on the nodes in I. Intuitively, if I is an information set for player i, µ(I)
describes i’s beliefs about the likelihood of being in each of the nodes in I. Then (~σ, µ) is a sequential
equilibrium if, for each player i and each information set I for player i, σi is a best response to ~σ−i
given i’s beliefs µ(I). An equivalent definition that does not require beliefs and is more suitable for
our setting is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3. [11, Proposition 6] Let G be an extensive-form game with perfect recall. There
exists a belief system µ such that (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium of G iff there exists a sequence of
completely mixed strategy profiles ~σ1, ~σ2, . . . converging to ~σ and a sequence δ1, δ2, . . . of nonnegative
real numbers converging to 0 such that, for each player i and each information set I for player i,
~σni is a δn-best response to ~σ
n
−i conditional on having reached I.
2.2 Computational indistinguishability
For a probabilistic algorithm A and an infinite bitstring r, A(x; r) denotes the output of A running
on input x with randomness r; A(x) denotes the distribution on outputs of A induced by considering
A(x; r), where r is chosen uniformly at random. A function  : N → [0, 1] is negligible if, for every
constant c ∈ N, (k) < k−c for sufficiently large k.
Definition 2.4. A probability ensemble is a sequence X = {Xn}n∈N of probability distribution
indexed by N. (Typically, in an ensemble X = {Xn}n∈N, the support of Xn consists of strings of
length n.)
We now recall the definition of computational indistinguishability [3].
Definition 2.5. Two probability ensembles {Xn}n∈N, {Yn}n∈N are computationally indistinguish-
able if, for all PPT TMs D, there exists a negligible function  such that, for all n ∈ N,
|Pr[D(1n, Xn) = 1]− Pr[D(1n, Yn) = 1]| ≤ (n).
To explain the Pr in the last line, recall that Xn and Yn are probability distributions. Although we
write D(1n, Xn), D is a randomized algorithm, so what D(1
n, Xn) returns depends on the outcome
of random coin tosses. To be a little more formal, we should write D(1n, Xn, r), where r is an
infinitely long random bit strong (of which D will only use a finite initial prefix). More formally,
taking PrXn to be the joint distribution over strings (x, r), where x is chosen according to Xn and
r is chosen according to the uniform distribution on bit-strings, we want
|PrXn [{(x, r) : D(1n, x, r) = 1}]− PrYn [{(y, r) : D(1n, y, r) = 1}] | ≤ (n).
We similarly abuse notation elsewhere in writing Pr.
We often call a TM M that is supposed to distinguish between two probability ensembles a
distinguisher.
5
2.3 Commitment schemes
We now define a cryptographic commitment scheme that will be used in our examples. Informally,
such a scheme is a two-phase two-party protocol for a sender and a receiver. In the first phase,
the sender sends a message to the receiver that commits the sender to a bit without giving the
receiver any information about that bit; in the second phase, the sender reveals the bit to which
he committed in a way that guarantees that this really is the bit he committed to.
Definition 2.6. A secure commitment scheme with perfect bindings is a pair of PPT algorithms
C and R such that:
• C takes as input a security parameter 1k, a bit b, and a bitstring r, and outputs
C(1k, b, r), C2(1
k, b, r), where C1(1
k, b, r), called the commitment string, is a k-bit string, and
C2(1
k, b, r), called the commitment key, is a (k− 1)-bit string. We use C(1k, b) to denote the
output distribution of algorithm C(1k, b, r) when r is chosen uniformly at random.
• R is a deterministic algorithm that gets as input two strings c and s and outputs o ∈ {0, 1, f}.
• (Hiding) {C1(1k, 0)}k∈N and {C1(1k, 1)}k∈N are computationally indistinguishable.
• (Perfect binding) R(C1(1k, b, r), (C2(1k, b, r)) = b for all k and r; moreover, if s 6= C2(1k, b, r),
then R(C1(1
k, b, r)), s) /∈ {0, 1}.
Cryptographers typically assume that secure commitment schemes with perfect bindings exist.
(Their existence would follow from the existence of one-way permutations; see [2] for further dis-
cussion and formal definitions.)
3 Computational Extensive-Form Games
3.1 Definitions
Statements of computational difficulty typically say that there is no (possibly randomized)
polynomial-time algorithm for solving a problem. To make sense of this, we need to consider,
not just one input, but a sequence of inputs, getting progressively larger. Similarly, to make sense
of computational games, we cannot consider a single game, but rather must consider a sequence of
games that grow in size. The games in the sequence share the same basic structure. This means
that, among other things, they involve the same set of players, playing in the same order, with
corresponding utility functions. To make this precise, we first start with a more general notion,
which we call a computable uniform sequence of games.
Definition 3.1. A computable uniform sequence G = {G1, G2, . . .} of games is a sequence that
satisfies the following conditions:
• All the games in the sequence involve the same set of players.
• Let Hn be the set of histories in Gn. There exists a polynomial p such that, for all nonterminal
histories h ∈ HNTn , A(h) ⊆ {0, 1}≤p(n).3 In addition, there is a PPT algorithm that, on input
1n and a history h, determines whether h ∈ Hn.
• There exists a polynomial-time computable function P ′ from ⋃∞n=1(HNTn ) to [c]. The function
Pn in game Gn ∈ G is then P ′ restricted to HNTn .
3{0, 1}≤p(n) denotes the language consisting of bitstrings of length at most p(n).
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• For each player i, there exists a polynomial-time computable function ui :
⋃∞
n=1H
T
n → R such
that the utility function of player i in game Gn is ui restricted to H
T
n .
We sometimes call a computable uniform sequence of games a computational game.
Computable uniform sequences of games already suffice to allow us to talk about polynomial-
time strategies. A strategy M for player i in a computable uniform sequence G = (G1, G2, . . .) is a
probabilistic TM that takes as input a pair (1n, v), where v is a view for player i in Gn (discussed
below), and outputs an action in A(I). We assume that the TMs are stateful ; they have a tape
on which the random bits used in previous rounds are recorded. The view of a stateful TM M
for player i in Gn is a tuple (vI , r), where vI is the representation of information set I and r
contains the randomness that has been used thus far (so is nondecreasing from round to round).
This can be viewed as having perfect recall of randomness, as the TMs are not allowed to “forget”
the randomness they used. It is considered part of their experience so far in the same way as the
actions that they played and the information sets that they visited.4
We next define what it means for a uniform sequence G = (G1, G2, . . .) of games to represent
an underlying game G. To explain different aspects of this definition, it is useful to go back to the
example in the introduction and discuss what it means for a sequence G to represent the game G in
Figure 1. As discussed before, we can implement this game using a commitment scheme. The point
is that now we get, not one game, but a sequence of games, one for each choice of security parameter.
Rather that putting a bit b in an envelope, in Gn player 1 sends C1(1
n, b). More precisely, he sends
C1(1
n, b, r), for a string r chosen chosen uniformly at random. To then open the envelope, player 1
can just send C2(1
n, b, r) and any other string to destroy it.
Roughly speaking, we want all the games in G to have the same “structure” as G. We formalize
this by requiring a surjective mapping fn from histories in each game Gn in the sequence to histories
in G. Note that fn is not, in general, one-to-one. There may be many histories in Gn representing
a single history in G. This can already be seen in our example; each of the histories in Gn where
player 1 sends C1(1
n, 1, r) get mapped to the history in G where player 1 puts 1 in an envelope.
Moreover, although C1(1
n, 0, r) and C1(1
n, 1, r) get mapped to histories in the same information
set in G, they are not in the same information set in Gn; an exponential-time player can break
the encryption and tell that they correspond to different bits being put in the envelope. Thus, the
mapping fn does not completely preserve the information structure. We require that h and fn(h)
have the same length (same number of actions). Of course, the utility associated with a terminal
history h in Gn is the same as that associated with history fn(h) in G.
The first three conditions below capture the relatively straightforward structural requirements
above. The final requirement imposes conditions on the players’ strategies, and is somewhat more
complicated. Informally, the fourth requirement is that there is a mapping F from strategies in
G to strategies in G, where F(σ) “corresponds” to σ in some appropriate sense. But what should
“correspond” mean? Let ~M be a strategy profile for G. For each game Gn ∈ G, ~M induces a
distribution denoted ψGn~M
on the terminal histories in Gn. By applying fn, we can push this forward
to a distribution φGn~M
on the terminal histories in G. A mixed strategy profile ~σ in G also induces
a distribution on the terminal histories in G, denoted ρ~σ.
Definition 3.2. A strategy profile ~σ corresponds to ~M if {φGn~M }n∈N is statistically close to {ρ~σ}n∈N:
that is, if HT are the terminal histories of G, then there exists a negligible function  such that, for
4 This assumption is equivalent to allowing the TM to have an additional tape on which it can save an arbitrary
state. For any TM M that does this, there is an equivalent TM M ′ that has no additional tape, but simply reconstructs
M ’s state by simulating M ’s computation from scratch using its view. This suffices, for example, to reconstruct a
secret key that was generated in the first round, so it can be used in later rounds.
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all n, ∑
h∈HT
|Pr
φGn
~M
[h]− Prρ~σ [h]| ≤ (n).
So one requirement we will have is that, for all strategy profiles ~σ in G, ~σ corresponds to
(F(σ1), . . . ,F(σn)), which we abbreviate as F(~σ). In addition, we require that the strategy profile
F(~σ) “knows” which underlying action it plays. We formalize this by requiring that, for strategy σ
in the underlying game, there is a TM Mσ that, given view v for player i in G, outputs the action
in G corresponding to the action played by F(σ) given view v.
Finally, we require a partial converse to the correspondence requirement. It is clearly too much
to expect a full converse. G has a richer structure than G; it allows for more ways for the players
to coordinate than G. So we cannot expect every strategy profile in G to correspond to a strategy
profile in G. Thus, we require only that strategies in a rather restricted class of strategy profiles
in G correspond to a strategy in G: namely, ones where we start with a strategy of the form F(~σ)
(which, by assumption, corresponds to ~σ), and allow one player to deviate. We must also use a
weaker notion of correspondence here. For example, in the game in Figure 1, even if we start with
a strategy of the form F(~σ), the deviating strategy M ′1 could be such that player 1 commits to 0
in Gn for n even, and commits to 1 in Gn for n odd. The strategy profile (M
′
1,F(σ2)) does not
correspond to any strategy profile in G. Thus, the notion of correspondence that we consider in
this case is that if i plays M ′i rather that F(σi), then there exists a sequence σ′1, σ′2, . . . of strategies
in G, rather that a single strategy σ′, and require only that the sequence {φGn
(M ′i ,F(~σ−i))}n∈N be
computationally indistinguishable from {ρ~σ}n∈N, rather than being statistically close.
Definition 3.3. A computable uniform sequence G = {G1, G2, . . .} represents an underlying game
G if the following conditions hold:
UG1. G and every game in G involve the same set of players.
UG2. For each game Gn ∈ G, there exists a surjective mapping fn from the histories in Gn to the
histories in G such that
(a) |h| = |fn(h)|;
(b) the same player moves in h and fn(h);
(c) if h′ is a subhistory of h, then fn(h′) is a subhistory of fn(h);
(d) if h and h′ are in the same information set in Gn, then fn(h) and fn(h′) are in the same
information set in G;
(e) for h ∈ H (a history of G), let LA(h) denote the last action played in h; if h and h′ are
in the same information set in Gn, then for any a such that h||a ∈ Hn, LA(fn(h||a)) =
LA(fn(h
′||a)) (where || is the concatenation operator).
UG3. If h is a terminal history of Gn, then the utility of each player i is the same in h and fn(h).
UG4. There is a mapping F from strategies in G to strategies in G such that
(a) for all strategy profiles ~σ in G, ~σ corresponds to F(~σ) = (F(σ1), . . . ,F(σn));
(b) for each strategy σ for player i in G, there exists a polynomial-time TM Mσ that, given
as input 1n and a view v for player i in Gn that is reachable when player i plays F(σi)
in Gn, returns an action for player i such that LA(fn(F(σ)(1n, v, rT ))) = Mσ(1n, v, rT ),
where rT is the random tape used (remember that the view contains the randomness used
so far);
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(c) for all strategy profiles ~σ in G, all players i, and all polynomial-time strategies M ′i for
player i in G, there exists a sequence σ′1, σ′2, . . . of strategies for player i in G such that
{φGn
(M ′i ,F(~σ−i))}n is computationally indistinguishable from {ρ
G
(σ′n,~σ−i)
}n.
Definition 3.3 requires the existence of a sequence ~f = (f1, f2 . . .) in UG2 and a function F in
UG4. When we want to refer specifically to f and F , we say that G 〈~f,F〉-represents G.
Note that UG2 requires that if h and h′ are in the same information set in Gn, then fn(h) and
fn(h
′) must be in the same information set in G. This means that we can view fn as a map from
information sets to information sets. However, it does not require the converse. As discussed above,
in G, an exponential-time player may be able to make distinctions between histories that cannot be
made of the corresponding histories in the underlying game. We would like to be able to say that a
polynomial-time player cannot distinguish h and h′ if fn(h) and fn(h′) are in the same information
set. As we show later, these conditions allow us to make such a claim.
Also note that since the game is finite, to show UG4(a) and UG4(b) hold, it is enough to
prove they hold for deterministic strategies. Given a mapping F that satisfies UG4(a) and (b) for
deterministic strategies, we can extend it to mixed strategies in the obvious way: since a mixed
strategy is just a probability distribution over finitely many deterministic strategies, it can be
implemented by a TM that plays that probability distribution up to negligible precision over the
corresponding mapping of the deterministic strategies (such an approximating distribution can be
easily constructed in polynomial time). It is obvious that UG4(a) still holds. UG4(b) holds since
using v and rT , we can reconstruct which deterministic strategy σ
′ in the support of σ was actually
used to reach v, and then use the corresponding TM Mσ
′
.
3.2 The commitment game as a uniform computable sequence
We now consider how these definitions play out in the game G in Figure 1 and the sequence
G = (G1, G2, . . .) described above where player 1 uses a commitment scheme as an envelope.
Lemma 3.4. G represents G.
Proof. First, we show that G is a computable uniform sequence. All the games in the sequence
involve exactly 2 players; the set of histories in Gn is a subset of {0, 1}≤n, and it is easy to compute
the next player to act; finally, the utility functions are polynomial-time computable by using the
TM R of the commitment scheme.
Next we show that the sequence represents G. There is an obvious mapping from histories of
the games in the sequence to histories of G: a commitment to 0 is mapped to 0, a commitment to
1 is mapped to 1, the action of player 2 is just mapped to the action in G, player 1 providing the
right key is mapped to action “open”, and player 1 providing a wrong key is mapped to “destroy”.
Finally, it is easy to verify that UG3 (the condition on utilities) holds.
To show that UG4 holds, we need to define a function F . A strategy for player 2 in G can’t
depend on player 1’s action, since player 2’s information set contains both actions. Thus, a deter-
ministic strategy σ2 for player 2 in G just plays an action in {0, 1}; the corresponding strategy
F(σ2) just plays the same string. UG4(b) holds trivially in this case. To define F(σ1) for a strat-
egy σ1 for player 1, we need to show how to implement each action of player 1. To play b at the
empty history in Gn, 1 plays the commitment string C1(1
n, b, r), where r is the randomness used
by player 1 in the computation (which is then saved as the TM’s state). To play the action “open”,
it computes k = C2(1
n, b, r); to play “destroy”, it plays k ⊕ 1 (a string other than the right key).
It is easy to see that UG4(b) holds for strategies of player 1. Moreover, it is easy to see that F(~σ)
corresponds to ~σ, so UG4(a) holds. We extend F to mixed strategies as described above.
To see that UG4(c) holds, observe that a strategy for player 1 in Gn can clearly be mapped
to a strategy in G: At the empty history player 1 has some distribution over commitments to 0
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and commitments to 1. This clearly maps to a distribution over putting 0 and 1 in the envelope.
At the other nodes where player 1 moves, Gn induces a distribution over correctly revealing the
commitment or doing some other action; again, this clearly maps to a distribution over “open” and
“destroy” in the obvious way. Since a strategy M ′1 for player 1 in G induces, for all n, a strategy M ′1,n
for player 1 in Gn, we can associate a sequence (σ
′
1, σ
′
2, . . .) with M
′
1. It is easy to check that, for all
strategies σ2 for player 2 in G, {φGn(M ′i ,F(σ2))}n is computationally indistinguishable from {ρ
G
(σ′n,σ2)
}n.
We similarly want to associate with each strategy for player 2 in G a sequence of strategies
in G. This is a little more delicate, since the information structure in Gn is not the same as that
in G. Given a strategy σ1 for player 1 in G, and an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy M2 for
player 2 in G, let Pn(b) be the probability that M2 plays b when (F(σ1),M2) is played in Gn.
Let σ′n be the strategy in G that plays according to the same distribution. We now claim that
{φGn(F(σ1),M2)}n is indistinguishable from {ρGσ1,σ′n}n. Assume, by way of contradiction, that it is not.
This can happen only if, for infinitely many n, M2 plays 0 and 1 with non-negligibly different
probabilities, depending on whether it is faced with a commitment to 0 or a commitment to 1.
But that means that, for infinitely many n, it can distinguish those two events with non-negligible
probability. This contradicts the assumption that the commitment scheme is secure.
3.3 Consistent partition structures
In this section, we discuss the connection between computational indistinguishability and informa-
tion structure in games. As we saw, when going from the game G in Figure 1 to the game G that
represents it, we replaced the information set in G (the use of an envelope) with computational in-
distinguishability (a commitment scheme). Although the games in G are perfect information games,
so that the players have complete information about a history, if player 1 uses the commitment
scheme appropriately, then player 2 does not really understand the “meaning” of a history (i.e.,
whether it represents a commitment to 0 or a commitment to 1). On the other hand, if player
1 “cheats” by using, for example, some low-entropy random string for the commitment, player 2
might have a strategy that is able to understand the “meaning” of its action. Thus, there is a sense
in which the information structure of a computational game depends on the strategies of the play-
ers. This dependence on strategies does not exist in standard games. If each of two histories h and
h′ in some information set I for player i has a positive probability of being reached by a particular
strategy profile, then when player i is in I, he will not know which of h or h′ was played, even if he
knows exactly what strategies are being played. The situation is different for computational games,
in a way we now make precise.
Suppose that G = (G1, G2, . . .) 〈~f,F〉-represents G and h is a history of G, so that f−1n (h) is
the set of histories of Gn that are mapped to h by fn. For a set H of histories of a game Gn ∈ G,
let Vn(H) be the set of views that a player can have at histories in H when Gn is played. For a
strategy profile ~M in G, let ξGn~M (v) be the probability of reaching view v ∈ Vn(H) if the players
play strategy profile ~M in Gn. For a set V of views, let ξ
Gn
~M
(V ) =
∑
v∈V ξ
Gn
~M
(v). For a set V of
mutually incompatible views (i.e., a set V of views such that for all distinct views v, v′ ∈ V , the
probability of reaching v given that v′ is reached is 0, and vice versa), let XV~M,n be a probability
distribution on V such that XV~M,n
(v) =
ξGn
~M
(v)
ξGn
~M
(V )
if ξGn~M
(V ) > 0, and 1|V | otherwise. Let ξ
G
~σ (S) denote
the probability of reaching a set S of histories in G if the players play strategy profile ~σ. Note that
if ξG~σ (S) > 0, then by UG4, for all sufficiently large n, we must have ξ
Gn
~M~σ
(Vn(f−1n (S))) > 0.
Definition 3.5. Let G 〈~f,F〉-represent a game G and let ~M be a strategy in G. A partition Ii of
H i (recall that this is the set of histories in G where i plays) is ~M -consistent for player i if, for
all non-singleton I ∈ Ii and all h ∈ I such that both ξGn~M (Vn(f
−1
n (h))) and ξ
Gn
~M
(Vn(f−1n (I \ h))) are
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non-negligible, {XVn(f−1n (h))~M,n }n∈N is computationally indistinguishable from {X
Vn(f−1n (I\{h}))
~M,n
}n∈N. A
partition structure ~I is ~M -consistent if, for all agents i, ~Ii is ~M -consistent.
Intuitively, a partition Ii for player i is consistent with a strategy profile ~M , if, when ~M is
played in G, for all I ∈ Ii and all histories h, h′ ∈ I, the distribution over views that map to h is
computationally indistringuishable from the distribution over views that map to h′. In our example,
this means that player 2 can’t distinguish between the distribution created by a commitment to 0
and the distribution created by a commitment to 1 if the commitment algorithm is run “honestly”
(using truly random strings).
Note that we do not enforce any condition on histories in G that are mapped back to a set of
histories that is reached with only negligible probability. This means there might be more than one
~M -consistent information partition.
We next show that if Ii is the information partition of player i in G, and G 〈~f,F〉-represent G
then for any strategy profile ~σ in G, Ii must be F(~σ)-consistent.
Theorem 3.6. If G 〈~f,F〉-represents G, Ii is the information partition of player i in G, and ~σ is
a strategy profile in G then Ii is F(~σ)-consistent.
Proof. We must show that if I ∈ Ii is a non-singleton information set for i in G and h ∈ I ,
then for all strategy profiles ~σ in G such that ξG~σ (h) > 0 and ξ
G
~σ (I \ {h}) > 0, {XVn(f
−1
n (h))
F(~σ),n }n∈N is
computationally indistinguishable from {XVn(f−1n (I\{h}))F(~σ),n }n∈N.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that h ∈ I, I is an information set for player i in G, and
there exists a strategy profile ~σ in G that reaches both h and I \ {h} with positive probability such
that {XVn(f−1n (h))F(~σ),n }n is distinguishable from {X
Vn(f−1n (I\{h}))
F(~σ),n }n. Thus, there exists a distinguisher
D for these distributions. Let a and a′ be distinct actions in A(I). (Recall that we assumed that
|A(I)| ≥ 2.) Let M ′ be a strategy for player i in G such that when M ′ reaches a history that maps
to I (by UG4(b) and the fact that the sets of actions available in each information set are disjoint,
this can be checked in polynomial time), M ′ uses D to distinguish if its view is in Vn(f−1n (h)) or
Vn(f−1n (I \ {h})). M ′ then plays an action mapped to a if D returns 0 and an action mapped to
a′ otherwise. At a history other than one in f−1n (I), M ′ plays like F(σi). It is easy to see that,
because {Xf−1n (h)F(~σ),n}n and {X
f−1n (I\{h})
F(~σ),n }n are distinguishable with non-negligible probability, there
is a non-negligible probability that the strategy M ′ is able to detect which case holds, and play
accordingly. That means that when histories of (M ′,F(σ−i)) are mapped to histories of G via fn,
there is a non-negligible gap between the probability of (h, a) and the probability of (h′, a) for
h′ ∈ I \ {h}. Since h ∈ I, there can be no strategy σ′ for player i such that (σ′, σ−i) has such a gap,
and UG4(c) cannot hold. This gives us the desired contradiction.
Note that Theorem 3.6 holds trivially if, for all Gi ∈ G, all the histories of G that map to I
are in the same information set in Gi. The theorem is of interest only when this is not the case. If
we think of G as an abstract model of a computational game G that represents it, this result can
be thought of as saying that information sets in G can model both real lack of information and
computational indistinguishability in G.
4 Solution Concepts for Computational Games
In this section, we consider analogues of two standard solution concepts in the context of com-
putational games: Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium, and prove that they exist if the
computational game represents a finite extensive-form game.
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4.1 Computational Nash equilibrium
Informally, a strategy profile in G is a computational Nash equilibrium if no player i has a profitable
polynomial-time deviation, where a deviation is taken to be profitable if it is profitable in infinitely
many games in the sequence. Recall that ψGn~M
is the distribution on the terminal histories in Gn
induced by a strategy profile ~M in G.
Definition 4.1. ~M = {M1, . . . ,Mc} is a computational Nash equilibrium of a computable uniform
sequence G if, for all players i ∈ [c] and for all polynomial-time strategies M ′i in G for player i,
there exists a negligible function , such that for all n,∑
h∈HTn
ψGn~M
(h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HTn
ψGn
(M ′, ~M−i)
(h)ui(h)− (n).
Our definition of computational NE is similar in spirit to that of Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [1],
although they formalize it by having the strategies depend on a security parameter and the utilities
depend only on actions in a single normal-form game (rather than a sequence of extensive-form
games). Our definition (and theirs) differs from the standard definition of -NE in two ways. First,
we restrict to polynomial-time deviations. This seems in keeping with our focus on polynomial-
time players. Second, we have a negligible loss of utility  in the definition, and  depends on
the deviation. (The fact that  depends on the deviation means that what we are considering
cannot be considered an -Nash equilibrium in the standard sense.) Of course, we could have given
a definition more in the spirit of the standard definition of Nash equilibrium by simply taking
 to be 0. However, the resulting solution concept would simply not be very interesting, given
our restriction to polynomial-time players. In general, there will not be a “best” polynomial-time
strategy; for every polynomial-time TM, there may be another TM that is better and runs only
slightly longer. For example, player 2 may be able to do a little better by spending a little more
time trying to decrypt the commitment in a commitment scheme. (See also the examples in [5].)
We now show that our model allows us to provide conditions that guarantee the existence of a
computational NE; to the best of our knowledge, this has not been done before (and is mentioned
as an open question in [10]). More specifically, we show that if a computational game G represents
G, then for every NE ~σ in G, there is a corresponding NE in G.
Theorem 4.2. If G 〈~f,F〉-represents G and ~σ is a NE in G, then F(~σ) is a computational NE of
G.
Proof. Suppose that ~σ is a NE in G. By UG4, ~σ corresponds to F(~σ). Thus, there exists some
negligible function  such that, for all n,∑
h∈HT
φGnF(~σ)(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σ (h)ui(h)− (n).
We claim that ~M~σ is a computational NE of G. Assume, by way of contradiction, that it is not.
That means there is some player i, some strategy M ′i for player i, and some constant c > 0 such
that, for infinitely many values of n,∑
h∈HT
φGn(M ′,F(~σ−i))(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
φGnF(~σ)(h)ui(h) +
1
nc
;
If not, we could have constructed a negligible function to satisfy the equilibrium condition.
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By combining the two equation we get that for infinitely many values of n,∑
h∈HT
φGn(M ′,F(~σ−i))(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σ (h)ui(h)− (n) +
1
nc
.
Since ~σ is a NE, we get that for all sequences σ′1, σ′2 . . . of strategies for player i in G,∑
h∈HT
ρG~σ (h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HT
ρG(σ′n,~σ−i)(h)ui(h).
This means that for infinitely many values of n, and for any such sequence,∑
h∈HT
φGn(M ′,F(σ−i))(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG(σ′n,~σ−i)(h)ui(h)− (n) +
1
nc
.
But this contradicts UG4(c), which says that there must exist a sequence σ′1, σ′2 . . . such that
{φGn
(M ′i ,F(~σ−i))}n is computationally indistinguishable from {ρ
G
(σ′n,~σ−i)
}n. Since the difference between
the two payoffs is not negligible, a distinguisher could just sample enough outcomes of these strate-
gies and compute the average payoff to distinguish the two distributions with non-negligible prob-
ability. Thus, ~M~σ must be a computational NE of G.
Theorem 4.2 shows that every NE in G has a corresponding NE in G. The converse does not
hold. This should not be surprising; the set of strategies in G is much richer than that in G. The
following example gives a simple illustration.
Example 4.3. Consider the 2-player game G′ that is like the game in Figure 1, except that the
payoff is 1 to both if they match and 0 otherwise (and both get −1 if player 1 does not open the
envelope). This game has three NE: both play 0; both play 1; and both play the mixed strategy that
gives probability 1/2 to each of 0 and 1. There is a computational game G′ that represents G′ that
is essentially identical to the game G described in Section 3.2, except that the payoffs are modified
appropriately. The game G′ has many more equilibria than G′, since player 1 can commit to 0 and
1 with 0.5 probability but use a fixed key that the second player knows (or choose a random key
from a low entropy set that the second player can enumerate). Player 2 can take advantage of this
to always play the matching action. There is no strategy in G′ that can mimic this behavior.
4.2 Computational sequential equilibrium
Our goal is to define a notion of computational sequential equilibrium. To do so, it is useful to
think about the standard definition of sequential equilibrium at an abstract level. Essentially, ~σ is
a sequential equilibrium if, for each player i, there is a partition I ′i of the histories where i plays
such that, at each cell I ∈ I ′i, player i has beliefs about the likelihood of being at each history
in I, and the action that he chooses at a history in I according to σi is a best response, given
these beliefs and what the other agents are doing (i.e., σ−i). The standard definition of sequential
equilibrium takes the partition I ′i to consist of i’s information sets. If we partition the histories into
singletons, we get a subgame-perfect equilibrium [13]. As we argued in Section 3.3, the information
sets sets in G are too fine, in general, to capture a player’s ability to distinguish. Thus, as a first step
to getting a notion of computational sequential equilibrium, we generalize the standard definition
of sequential equilibrium in a straightforward way to get ~I-sequential equilibrium, where Ii is an
arbitrary partition of the histories where i plays.
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Definition 4.4. Given a partition ~I, ~σ is a ~I-sequential equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence
of completely mixed strategy profiles ~σ1, ~σ2, . . . converging to ~σ and a sequence δ1, δ2, . . . of nonneg-
ative real numbers converging to 0 such that, for each player i and each set I ∈ Ii, ~σni is a δn-best
response to ~σn−i conditional on having reached I.
What are reasonable partition structures to use when considering a computational game? As
we suggested, using the information partition structure of G seems unreasonable. For example,
in our example commitment game, this does not allow the second player to act the same when
facing commitments to 0 and commitments to 1, although, as we argued earlier, if player 1 plays
appropriately, a computationally bounded player cannot distinguish these two events.
It seems reasonable to have histories in the same cell of the partition if the player cannot
distinguish what these histories actually “represent”. For general uniform computable sequences it
is unclear what “represents” should mean. However, if G represents a game G, then we do have in
some sense a representation for a history: the history it maps to in the underlying game. As we saw
in Section 3.3, what a player can infer from a history might depend not just on the information
partition structure of the games in G, but also on the strategies played by the players in G. Thus,
a natural candidate for a partition structure ~I when ~M is the strategy profile played is a partition
that is based on an ~M -consistent partition structure ~IG of the histories of G. We now formalize
this intuition.
Suppose that G 〈~f,F〉-represents G. Given a set I ⊆ H, let IGn be the set consisting of histories
h ∈ Gn such that fn(h) ∈ I. Given two strategies M and M ′ for a player in G, let (M, I,M ′) be the
TM that plays like M in Gn up to IGn , and then switches to playing M
′ from that point on. For
a game Gn ∈ G, a strategy profile ~M , and a set H ′n of histories in Gn that is reached with positive
probability when ~M is played, let φGn~M,H′n
be the probability on terminal histories in G induced by
pushing forward the probability on terminal histories in Gn conditioned on reaching H
′
n (where we
identify the event “reaching H ′n” with the set of terminal histories that extend a history in H ′n).
We can similarly define ρG~σ,H′ for a subset H
′ of histories in G.
Definition 4.5. Suppose that G 〈~f,F〉-represents G. Then ~M = {M1, . . . ,Mc} is a computational
sequential equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategies ~M1, ~M2, . . .
converging to ~M and a sequence δ1, δ2, . . . converging to 0 such that, for all k, n, and players
i ∈ [c], there exists an ~M -consistent partition Ii such that, for all sets I ∈ Ii and all polynomial-
time strategies M ′ for player i in G, there exists a negligible function  such that∑
h∈HT
φGn~Mk,IGn
(h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HT
φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i),IGn
(h)ui(h)− (n)− δk.
We now claim that, as with NE, if ~σ is a sequential equilibrium of an extensive form game G
with perfect recall and G 〈~f,F〉-represents G, then F(~σ) is a computational sequential equilibrium
of G.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose that G 〈~f,F〉-represents G and G has perfect recall. If there exists a belief
function µ such that (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium in G, then F(~σ) is a computational sequential
equilibrium of G.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a belief system µ such that (~σ, µ) is a sequential equilibrium in
G. Thus, there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles ~σ1, ~σ2, . . . that converges to
~σ and a sequence δ1, δ2, . . . that converges to 0 such that for all players i, all information sets I for
i in G, and all strategies σ′ for i that act like σ on all prefixes of histories in I, we have that∑
h∈HT
ρG~σk,I(h)ui(h) ≥
∑
h∈HT
ρG
(σ′,~σk−i),I
(h)ui(h)− δk. (1)
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Assume, by way of contradiction, that ~M = F(~σ) is not a computational sequential equilibrium.
Let Mki be the TM that acts like F(σki ) except that at a view it is called to play, with probability
1
2nk
(which is negligible), it plays an arbitrary legal action, chosen uniformly at random. Note that
this makes Mki completely mixed, while ensuring that
~Mk still corresponds to ~σk. Also note that
the sequence ~M1, ~M2, . . . converges to ~M . By Theorem 3.6, if Ii is the information partition of
player i in G, then Ii is ~Mk-consistent for all k, and, in particular, is also ~M -consistent. Since ~M is
not a computational sequential equilibrium, there must be some k, player i, information set I for i
in G, strategy M ′i for i, and constant c such that, for infinitely many values of n,∑
h∈HT
φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i),IGn
(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
φGn~Mk,IGn
(h)ui(h) +
1
nc
+ δk. (2)
Since ~σk is completely mixed, every terminal history is reached with positive probability. Thus,
IGn is reached with positive probability. Since ~M
k corresponds to ~σk, {φGn~Mk,IGn}n (the conditional
ensemble) must be statistically close to {ρG
~σk,I
}n, for otherwise we could use the distinguisher
for these ensembles to distinguish the unconditional ensembles. It follows that there exists some
negligible function  such that, for all n,∑
h∈HT
φGn~Mk,IGn
(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σk,I(h)ui(h)− (n). (3)
From (2) and (3), it follows that, for infinitely many values of n,∑
h∈HT
φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i),IGn
(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG~σk,I(h)ui(h)− (n) +
1
nc
+ δk. (4)
By UG4(c), there is a sequence σ′1, σ′2, . . . of strategies for i in G such that {φGn(( ~Mki ,I,M ′), ~Mk−i)}n is
computationally indistinguishable from {ρG
(σ′n,~σk−i)
}n. Since, for n sufficiently large, IGn is reached
with non-negligible probability by ~Mk, and ( ~Mki , I,M
′) acts like ~Mki in all prefixes of histories
in IGn , it must be the case that for n sufficiently large, (( ~M
k
i , I,M
′), ~Mk−i) reaches IGn with non-
negligible probability. Moreover, {φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′), ~Mk−i),IGn
}n is computationally indistinguishable from
{ρG
(σ′n,~σk−i),I
}n. If not, again, a distinguisher for the unconditional distributions can just use the
distinguisher for the conditional distribution by calling it only when the sampled history is such
that I is visited. From (1) and (4), we get that for infinitely many values of n,∑
h∈HT
φGn
(( ~Mki ,I(I),M ′), ~Mk−i),IGn
(h)ui(h) >
∑
h∈HT
ρG
(σ′n,~σk−i),I
(h)ui(h)(h)ui(h)− (n) + 1
nc
.
But, as in previous arguments, this contradicts the assumption that {φGn
(( ~Mki ,I,M
′
i),
~Mk−i),IGn
}n is com-
putationally indistinguishable from {ρG
(σ′n,~σk−i),I
}n. Thus, ~M~σ is a computational sequential equilib-
rium of G.
What are the beliefs represented by this equilibrium? The beliefs we get are such that the
players believe that, except with negligible probability, only strategies that are mappings (via F)
of strategies in the underlying game were used, so they explain deviations in the computational
game in terms of deviations in the underlying game.
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One consequence of using completely mixed strategies in the standard setting is that a player
always assigns positive probability to wherever he may find himself. In our setting, while we also
require strategies to be completely mixed, a player i may still find himself in a situation (i.e., may
have a view) to which he ascribes probability 0, so he knows his beliefs are bound to be incorrect.
This can happen only if the randomness in i’s state is inconsistent with the moves that i made
that led to the current view. (This can happen if, for example, i ignored the random string when
computing the commitment string, and just outputted a string of all 1’s.) While i may ascribe
probability 0 to his earlier moves, deviations by other players always result in views to which i
ascribes positive probability, so such deviations can not be used as signals or threats.
By considering a consistent partitions here, we effectively average the expected payoff over all
histories of Gn that map to the same information set in I. Note that, for each specific history in
this set, there might be a better TM. For example, in the commitment game discussed before, for
each commitment string, there is a TM for player 2 that does better then the prescribed protocol:
the one that plays the right value given that string. However, our notion considers the expected
value over all these histories, and thus a good deviation does not exist. Since no polynomial-time
TM can tell to which histories in the underlying game these histories are mapped (via f), we treat
cells in a consistent partition just as traditional information sets are treated in the standard notion
of sequential equilibrium.
5 Application: Implementing a Correlated Equilibrium Without
a Mediator
In this section, we show that our approach can help us analyze protocols that use cryptography
to implement a correlated equilibrium (CE) in a normal-form game. Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [1]
(DHR) were the first to use cryptographic techniques to implement a CE. They did so using a
protocol that they showed was a NE, provided that players are computationally bounded (for a
notion of computational NE that is related to ours). However, as discussed by Gradwohl, Livne,
and Rosen [4] (GLR), DHR’s proposed protocol does not satisfy solution concepts that also require
some sort of sequential rationality. DHR’s protocol punishes deviations using a minimax strategy
that may give the punisher as well as the player being punished a worse payoff; thus, it is just
an empty threat. To deal with this issue, GLR introduce a solution concept that they call Threat
Free Equilibrium (TFE), which explicitly eliminates such empty threats. GLR additionally provide
a protocol that can implement a CE in a normal-form game that is a convex combination of NEs
(CCNE), without using a mediator; the GLR protocol is a TFE if the players are computationally
bounded.
We now provide a protocol similar in spirit to the one used in GLR that implements a CCNE;
our protocol is a computational sequential equilibrium if the players are computationally bounded.
Unlike GLR, we are able to apply our approach to CEs in games with more than 2 players, as
well as being able to implement CCNEs that are not Pareto optimal. One more advantage of our
approach is that since we allow the underlying game to be one of imperfect information, there is
a natural way to model a normal-form game (where players are assumed to move simultaneously)
as an extensive-form game: players just move sequentially without learning what the other player
does. Since GLR’s results apply only to games of perfect information, they had to argue that they
could extend their result to normal-form games.
We require that the CCNE is of finite support, that all its coefficients are rational numbers,
and that each of the NEs in its support has coefficients that are rational numbers.5 We call such
CCNEs nice. Note that any CCNE can be approximated to arbitrary accuracy by a nice CCNE.
5GLR also made these assumptions. In fact, they required a slightly stronger condition; they required all the
coefficients to be rational numbers whose denominator is a power of two.
16
III
𝟎 𝟏
𝟎 𝟏
I
𝟎 𝟏
Op Op Op OpDes Des Des Des
II
𝒍𝒆𝒇𝒕 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕
𝒍𝒆𝒇𝒕 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕
I
1 -1
Figure 2: An example of the game Gcorr where ` = 2 and G is a coordination game
Given a normal-form game G with a nice CCNE pi, we show how to convert it to an extensive-
form game Gcorr that implements this CE without using cryptography, but using envelopes; that
is, Gcorr has a sequential equilibrium with the same distribution over outcomes in G as pi. We then
show how to implement Gcorr as a computational game using a cryptographic protocol.
Given G and pi, let ` be the least common denominator of the coefficients of pi. Let Gcorr be
the game where player 1 first puts an element of {0, . . . , `− 1} in an envelope, then player 2 plays
an element in {0, . . . , `− 1} without knowing what player 1 played (all the histories where player 2
makes his first move are in the same information set of player 2). Then player 1 can either open the
envelope or destroy it. All the histories after player 1 opens the envelope form singleton information
sets for the other players; all histories after player 1 destroys the envelope and 2 initially played
j are in the same information set for the players other than 1, for j ∈ {0, . . . , ` − 1}. Then G is
played. (Note that G might involve many players other than 1 and 2, but 1 and 2 are the only
players who play in the initial part of Gcorr .) The players move sequentially: first player 2 moves,
then player 1 moves (without knowing player 2’s move), then player 3 moves (without knowing 1
and 2’s moves), and so on. The payoffs of Gcorr depend only on the players’ moves when playing
the G component of Gcorr , and are the same as the payoffs in G. See Figure 2 for a game Gcorr
when ` is 2 and G is a coordination game: that is, in G, each player moves either left or right, and
each gets a payoff of 1 if they make the same move, and -1 if they make different moves.
Let σ be a NE in G in which player 1’s payoff is no better than it is in any other NE in G.
Now consider the following simple strategies for the players in Gcorr . Intuitively, the players start
by picking a NE in the support of pi to play, with probability proportional to its coefficient in pi.
To this end, fix an ordering of length ` of the NEs in the support of pi, where each NE appears
a number of times proportional to its weight in the convex combination that makes up pi. At the
empty history, player 1 selects an action a uniformly at random from {0, . . . , `− 1} and puts it in
the envelope. Then player 2 also selects an action b uniformly at random from {0, . . . , `− 1}. Then
player 1 opens the envelope. The players then play the NE in place (a+ b mod `) in the ordering
of NEs. If player 1 does not open, the players play according to σ. Call the resulting strategy profile
~σpi. It is not hard to verify that ~σpi implements pi, and that there exists a probability measure µ
such that (~σpi, µ) is a sequential equilibrium of Gcorr . Defining µ is easy: the only information sets
not reached with positive probability (and hence µ is determined) are the one where “destroy” is
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played. At that point, the players’ play σ, so they are best responding to each other, no matter
what their beliefs are.
So now all we have to provide is a computational game Gcorr that represents Gcorr, where the
games in Gcorr use cryptography instead an envelope for the first part of the game. Let d be such
that 2d−1 ≤ ` < 2d. Let Gcorr be the sequence where Gn is the game where, at the empty history,
player 1 commits to a d-bit string by using d commitments in parallel, each with key length n− 1
and outputs the d commitment strings as his action. Player 2 then plays a bitstring of length d
that can be viewed as a binary representation of a number in {0, . . . , `− 1}. Player 1 then plays a
string that is intended to be the commitment keys of the d commitments. Then the players play a
string representing their action in G (again using its binary representation). The utility are then
given by the utility functions in G.
We now claim that Gcorr represents Gcorr.
Theorem 5.1. Gcorr represents Gcorr.
Proof. It is obvious that Gcorr is a computable uniform sequence. We now show that it represents
Gcorr. The mappings ~f of histories maps player 1’s commitments to a string s to the action s
mod `. (Notice that the fact we used d commitments in parallel does not change the fact that the
commitments are perfectly binding and thus this is well defined.) Actions of player 2 are mapped
to an action s mod ` according to their binary representation; if player 1 reveals d valid keys in h,
then in fn(h) he plays “open”, and otherwise he plays “destroy”; the actions of G are mapped in
the obvious way.
To show that UG4 holds, we proceed as follows: The mapping F for a player j other than 1 and
2 is obvious: It is easy to compute using the TM R of the commitment scheme if the commitments
were opened successfully or not, so j can compute at which information set of Gcorr he is at
(given his view), and play the binary representation of the action that the strategy plays at that
information set. For player 2, note that player 2’s first action in Gcorr can’t depend on player 1’s
action, since player 2’s information set contains all the histories. Thus, a deterministic strategy σ2
for player 2 in Gcorr just plays an action in {0, . . . , `−1}; F(σ2) just plays the same action at player
2’s first information set in Gcorr . Similarly to the other players, F(σ2) also plays the same action in
G as σ2 when player 2 is called upon to play again. Given a deterministic strategy σ1 for player 1,
if σ1 plays a at the first step in Gcorr , F(σ1) chooses uniformly at random one of the d-bit strings
such that s = a mod ` (there are at most 2 such strings), and plays the commitments strings
C1(1
n, s1, r1), . . . , Cd(1
n, sd, rd), where r = r1|| . . . ||rd is the prefix of the random tape representing
the randomness used to compute the commitment strings. To play the action “open”, it computes
ki = C2(1
n, si, ri) and play k1|| . . . ||kd; to play “destroy”, it plays k1|| . . . ||kd⊕1 (a string other than
the right keys). Again, it is obvious how player 1 plays in G. It is easy to see that F(~σ) corresponds
to ~σ, so UG4(a) holds. UG4(b) holds for all players trivially given these strategies.
It is also obvious that UG4(c) holds for player 1. Since the information structure it faces at
Gcorr and Gcorr is essentially the same, anything it can do in Gcorr can be done by a strategy in
Gcorr by just looking at the distribution of actions in histories that map to each information set.
The other players have different information structures in Gcorr and Gcorr , since they see the
commitment strings in Gcorr. We discuss UG4(c) for player 2 here; the argument in the case of
the others is similar (and simpler). Let σi for i 6= 2 be a strategy for player i in Gcorr, and let
Mi = F(σi). Let M ′ be an arbitrary polynomial time strategy for player 2 in Gcorr, and let Dn1 be
the distribution M ′’s first action in Gn; let Dnj,w be the distribution over the actions of M
′ in G
given that the commitment was opened successfully, player 1 committed to j, and player 2’s first
move was w; and let Dnw be the distribution over the actions of M
′ in Gn if the commitment is
not opened successfully and player 2’s first move was w. Let σ′n be a strategy in Gcorr for player
2 that plays according to these distributions. We claim that {φGn(M1,M ′,...,Mc)}n is indistinguishable
from {ρGcorr(σ1,σ′n,...,σc)}n.
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Let φGn,1(M1,M ′,...,Mc) be the distribution over histories ending at the first action of player 2 when
(M1,M
′, . . . ,Mc) is played in Gn and mapped using fn to histories of Gcorr, and let ρ
Gcorr,1
(σ1,σ′n,...,σc)
be the distribution over partial histories ending at the first action of player 2 when (σ1, σ
′
n, . . . , σc)
is played in Gcorr. We first claim that {φGn,1(M1,M ′,...,Mc)}n is indistinguishable from {ρ
Gcorr,1
(σ1,σ′n,...,σc)
}n.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that it is not. This can happen only if, for infinitely many n, M ′
plays some action a with probabilities that differ non-negligibly, depending on whether it is faced
with a commitment to different strings s or s′. But that means that for infinitely many n, it can
distinguish those two events with non-negligible probability. This contradicts the assumption that
the commitment scheme is secure. (Note that it is easy to show that, because a single commitment
has the hiding property, then even when d such commitments are run in parallel, no polynomial-time
TM should be able to distinguish between commitments to s and s′.)
It is easy to see that this also means that the distribution over partial histories just before
player 2 plays again are also indistinguishable. Now if the commitment is opened successfully, then
the information structure player 2 faces in Gcorr is the same as in Gcorr , and thus the statement
is obviously true. If the commitments were not opened, than by using a argument similar to that
used for player 2’s first action, we can argue that if the distributions over partial histories just after
player 2 plays again are not indistinguishable, then again we can use that as a distinguisher for the
commitment scheme.
By Theorems 4.6 and 5.1, since ~σµ (with the appropriate beliefs) is a sequential equilibrium of
Gcorr , F(~σµ) is a computational sequential equilibrium of Gcorr .
6 Conclusion
The model introduced in this paper is a first step towards a better understanding of polynomially
bounded players playing finite games. We defined a sense in which a sequence G of games represents
a single underlying game G, gave a novel definition of a computational sequential equilibrium,
and provided conditions under which a computational sequential equilibrium (and hence also a
computational NE) exists in G. Moreover, the model allows us to separate the cryptographic analysis
from the strategic analysis. We show how we can use our model and definitions to analyze complex
cryptographic protocols in a way that captures our intuitions about the rational behavior of the
players in those protocols.
An important next step is to refine the model so it can capture more complex cryptographic
protocols. For example, some cryptographic protocols do not have a unique map between histories
and actions (e.g., a computationally binding commitment can map a string to both 0 or 1 depending
on the key). They also might have abstract actions that are hard to compute (for instance, there
might be strings that are not valid commitments at all but it might be hard to compute them),
or require a few implementation steps to implement one abstract step. One possible direction is to
map a history and the TMs’ views into histories in the game. While this might solve some of the
issues raised, it also introduces new challenges, which we intend to investigate.
While in this paper we focus only on computationally bounded players represented by
polynomial-time TMs (which seems most appropriate for the cryptographic applications we have
in mind), we believe that our approach of relating a sequence of games to a single underlying game,
and capturing computational indisitingushability with the information structure of this game can
be applied to other models of computations with the appropriate adaptation of computational
indisitingushability.
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